I do not think your Iran means what you think it means

(ok, yes, I know, I've used that gag before, but, um, luckily, I have very few regular readers, so who'm I hurting?)

Nice article in Newsweek by Fareed Zakaria here briefly highlighting the political structure of Iran (in brief: complicated) and why it might indeed not be developing nuclear weapons. (I've discussed this topic here, here, and here.) As I've said before and am saying again, and Zakaria backs me up on this, think the Mullahs and Ahmedinejad are crazy all you want, but they're not MAD; that is, they're not immune to the salient guiding ideas of nuclear weapons, Mutually Assured Destruction. Zakaria elaborates on the plans and aspirations of some within the Iranian regime, as well as the declarations of the present-day Iranian regime's founding father and other, um, luminaries that nuclear weapons are un-Islamic:

The country's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, issued a fatwa in 2004 describing the use of nuclear weapons as immoral. In a subsequent sermon, he declared that "developing, producing or stockpiling nuclear weapons is forbidden under Islam." Last year Khamenei reiterated all these points after meeting with the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei. Now, of course, they could all be lying. But it seems odd for a regime that derives its legitimacy from its fidelity to Islam to declare constantly that these weapons are un-Islamic if it intends to develop them. It would be far shrewder to stop reminding people of Khomeini's statements and stop issuing new fatwas against nukes.

Happily, most of the rhetoric seeming to be on a path to war with Iran has ceased, though the conclusion that they are developing nuclear weapons seems to continue unabated (and disbelief of the last time our own intelligence said they weren't developing weapons anymore and were less determined to do so than before is so high that it doesn't warrant a mention, seemingly).

(Hmm, immediate postscript: naturally, the debate on Iran's nuclear weapons development is more complicated than it appears, though I still tend to agree with Zakaria. But from Foreign Policy:

"This is another reflection of the grossly mistaken reaction to the intelligence estimate on this subject in late 2007, a reaction that stemmed in large part from some infelicitous and misleading formulations in the estimate itself," says former senior CIA official Paul Pillar. "The only thing reportedly halted in 2003 was weapons design work. More important is what [the LAT] mentions in the latter half of his piece, the continuation of uranium enrichment -- which, as the Bush administration correctly pointed out, is the long pole in the tent that will determine when Iran would have the capability to build a nuclear weapon.

Of course, developing nuclear power is well within Iran's international rights, it scares everyone to think that they could get close to a weapon. Suffice it to say, I'm scared of ANYONE having nuclear weapons, as everyone should be:

Surely no sane person wants Iran (or any nation) to develop nuclear weapons. A reasonable resolution of the present crisis would permit Iran to develop nuclear energy, in accord with its rights under the Non- Proliferation Treaty, but not nuclear weapons. Is that outcome feasible? It would be, given one condition: that the U.S. and Iran were functioning democratic societies in which public opinion had a significant impact on public policy.

As it happens, this solution has overwhelming support among Iranians and Americans, who generally are in agreement on nuclear issues. The Iranian-American consensus includes the complete elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere (82% of Americans); if that cannot yet be achieved because of elite opposition, then at least a "nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East that would include both Islamic countries and Israel" (71% of Americans). Seventy-five percent of Americans prefer building better relations with Iran to threats of force. In brief, if public opinion were to have a significant influence on state policy in the U.S. and Iran, resolution of the crisis might be at hand, along with much more far-reaching solutions to the global nuclear conundrum.

--(from a piece by Noam Chomsky, re-posted in part in the J Continuum here).

And as I said in "Iran: Can't get fooled again?":

been used by... us, the US. We had our reasons (whose conclusions I question, but that's a different story). But nonetheless, in the issue of the insanity of destroying millions of people, only we have enaged in that. In the insanity of mutually assured destruction, well -- no one has ever engaged on that with nukes, and need we say that WE had the same posture on that as the USSR? Dr. Strangelove notwithstanding, we've not proved we're necessarily saner than self-concerned despots with nukes who refuse to use them so as to save their own hides. SO -- I'm just sayin', while it's too early to assume Ahmadinejad doesn't mean us harm and indeed is not the "Jew-hating, Holocaust-denying Islamo-fascist who has threatened to 'wipe Israel off the map'" he's been said to be, it's also way too early to determine he IS, barring the "truthiness" we feel of an Iranian head of state being antagonistic, messianic, anti-semitic, and dangerous. Just because we looked Iran up in our gut and found it under "danger" doesn't mean that we're on our path to not being fooled again...

So... can we get fooled again?

--J

Iran: Not Crazy After All These Years

Not to overflog what ends up being a small, reluctant, and late-in-coming symbolic gesture, but Slate's TP notes today:

The NYT and LAT front, and everyone covers, news that the Iranian-American journalist who had been convicted of spying in Iran and sentenced to eight years in prison was released yesterday. Roxana Saberi had been in jail since January, and the Obama administration had been speaking up to try to secure Saberi's release. Last month, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called for a careful review of the case in what the NYT says might have been a bid to try to improve relations with the United States before the June elections. The LAT takes it a bit further and says that while the arrest shows the Iranian system remains unpredictable, it's at least "capable of flexibility, pragmatism and even damage control." Ahmadinejad's press adviser cryptically declared: "Maybe we want people to read into this." (emphasis added)

The reason this is significant is that one of the arguments for why Iran is an "existential threat" to US interests, Israel, and even the US homeland itself, is that as militant crazy-fuck religious extremists, it is proclaimed, assumed, declared, etc. that they can't be reasoned with, that engagement doesn't work, and that if they did get nukes, somehow the realpolitik of MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) wouldn't work on them. (An alternative analysis of course is that Iran wants nukes to put it on par with Israel and as a safeguard against US or Israeli attack, especially as Israel is an undeclared nuclear power and therefore technically should NOT be eligible for "U.S. economic, and military assistance, and export credits", rather than historically being the single biggest recipient of US foreign aid, receiving more than all of Latin America and the Caribbean in 1998, or ~12% of total US foreign aid*.)

If Iran indeed is pliable to the normal carrots and sticks of international politics, it can hardly be viably referred to as an "existential threat", certainly not uncategorically so, especially in light of Israel's NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) intransigence on the one hand, and, say, Egypt's former and still status as one of the top five recipients of US foreign aid despite its continued, and largely unremarked-upon in the US, political repression of its own citizens. That is to say, if Iran, a state the US considers to be an antagonist, if not an enemy, is seemingly equally or more willing to release an injustly jailed reporter than Egypt, a nominal US ally, it would appear irrational to consider Iran an irrational state immune to normal negotiation, and therefore, only "solvable" militarily.

*For reasons unknown to J, foreign aid to Israel from the US appears to have declined 90% in the past decade, which I have not heard referenced in the news at all. Part of it is certainly shifts in aid to Afghanistan and Iraq, but Israel in 2007 was also surpassed by countries like Kenya, Benin, Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, El Salvador, and many others. My guess is that aid to Israel has shifted to more "off-the-books" types, that is, not illegal aid, but indirect aid like discounted weapons sales, but I have no evidence for that. Still, it seems simply unlikely that US policy to Israel would have such a dramatic shift without remark in the US press or Israeli statements reported in the US. It seems more likely to me that aid was quietly changed than that it was quietly dropped to one of the lower rates among our major allies, client states, and poorer "Third World" countries.

And now for a word...

We interrupt your irregularly scheduled blogging for a word from Noam Chomsky, most widely quoted author in the world and persona non grata in the US:

"...Doubtless Iran's government merits harsh condemnation, including for its recent actions that have inflamed the crisis. It is, however, useful to ask how we would act if Iran had invaded and occupied Canada and Mexico and was arresting U.S. government representatives there on the grounds that they were resisting the Iranian occupation (called "liberation," of course). Imagine as well that Iran was deploying massive naval forces in the Caribbean and issuing credible threats to launch a wave of attacks against a vast range of sites -- nuclear and otherwise -- in the United States, if the U.S. government did not immediately terminate all its nuclear energy programs (and, naturally, dismantle all its nuclear weapons). Suppose that all of this happened after Iran had overthrown the government of the U.S. and installed a vicious tyrant (as the US did to Iran in 1953), then later supported a Russian invasion of the U.S. that killed millions of people (just as the U.S. supported Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran in 1980, killing hundreds of thousands of Iranians, a figure comparable to millions of Americans). Would we watch quietly?

It is easy to understand an observation by one of Israel's leading military historians, Martin van Creveld. After the U.S. invaded Iraq, knowing it to be defenseless, he noted, "Had the Iranians not tried to build nuclear weapons, they would be crazy."

Surely no sane person wants Iran (or any nation) to develop nuclear weapons. A reasonable resolution of the present crisis would permit Iran to develop nuclear energy, in accord with its rights under the Non- Proliferation Treaty, but not nuclear weapons. Is that outcome feasible? It would be, given one condition: that the U.S. and Iran were functioning democratic societies in which public opinion had a significant impact on public policy.

As it happens, this solution has overwhelming support among Iranians and Americans, who generally are in agreement on nuclear issues. The Iranian-American consensus includes the complete elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere (82% of Americans); if that cannot yet be achieved because of elite opposition, then at least a "nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East that would include both Islamic countries and Israel" (71% of Americans). Seventy-five percent of Americans prefer building better relations with Iran to threats of force. In brief, if public opinion were to have a significant influence on state policy in the U.S. and Iran, resolution of the crisis might be at hand, along with much more far-reaching solutions to the global nuclear conundrum.

...Democracy promotion at home is certainly feasible and, although we cannot carry out such a project directly in Iran, we could act to improve the prospects of the courageous reformers and oppositionists who are seeking to achieve just that. Among such figures who are, or should be, well-known, would be Saeed Hajjarian, Nobel laureate Shirin Ebadi, and Akbar Ganji, as well as those who, as usual, remain nameless, among them labor activists about whom we hear very little; those who publish the Iranian Workers Bulletin may be a case in point.

We can best improve the prospects for democracy promotion in Iran by sharply reversing state policy here so that it reflects popular opinion. That would entail ceasing to make the regular threats that are a gift to Iranian hardliners. These are bitterly condemned by Iranians truly concerned with democracy promotion (unlike those "supporters" who flaunt democracy slogans in the West and are lauded as grand "idealists" despite their clear record of visceral hatred for democracy).

Democracy promotion in the United States could have far broader consequences. In Iraq, for instance, a firm timetable for withdrawal would be initiated at once, or very soon, in accord with the will of the overwhelming majority of Iraqis and a significant majority of Americans. [Blogger's note: A point made here before...] Federal budget priorities would be virtually reversed. Where spending is rising, as in military supplemental bills to conduct the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it would sharply decline. Where spending is steady or declining (health, education, job training, the promotion of energy conservation and renewable energy sources, veterans benefits, funding for the UN and UN peacekeeping operations, and so on), it would sharply increase. Bush's tax cuts for people with incomes over $200,000 a year would be immediately rescinded.

...[The U.S.] would allow the UN to take the lead in international crises, including in Iraq. After all, according to opinion polls, since shortly after the 2003 invasion, a large majority of Americans have wanted the UN to take charge of political transformation, economic reconstruction, and civil order in that land.

If public opinion mattered, the U.S. would accept UN Charter restrictions on the use of force, contrary to a bipartisan consensus that this country, alone, has the right to resort to violence in response to potential threats, real or imagined, including threats to our access to markets and resources. The U.S. (along with others) would abandon the Security Council veto and accept majority opinion even when in opposition to it. The UN would be allowed to regulate arms sales; while the U.S. would cut back on such sales and urge other countries to do so, which would be a major contribution to reducing large-scale violence in the world. Terror would be dealt with through diplomatic and economic measures, not force, in accord with the judgment of most specialists on the topic but again in diametric opposition to present-day policy.

Furthermore, if public opinion influenced policy, the U.S. ...would join the broad international consensus on a two-state settlement of the Israel-Palestine conflict, which (with Israel) it has blocked for 30 years -- with scattered and temporary exceptions -- and which it still blocks in word, and more importantly in deed, despite fraudulent claims of its commitment to diplomacy. The U.S. would also equalize aid to Israel and Palestine, cutting off aid to either party that rejected the international consensus.

Evidence on these matters is reviewed in my book Failed States as well as in The Foreign Policy Disconnect by Benjamin Page (with Marshall Bouton), which also provides extensive evidence that public opinion on foreign (and probably domestic) policy issues tends to be coherent and consistent over long periods. Studies of public opinion have to be regarded with caution, but they are certainly highly suggestive.

Democracy promotion at home, while no panacea, would be a useful step towards helping our own country become a "responsible stakeholder" in the international order (to adopt the term used for adversaries), instead of being an object of fear and dislike throughout much of the world."

Emphasis added. Reposted from TomDispatch.com and Portside.org.

"Noam Chomsky is the author of Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy (Metropolitan Books), just published in paperback, among many other works.
Copyright 2007 Noam Chomsky"

Ta ta for now.

I do not think the Holocaust Denial Conference means what you think it means

More stuff on how Pres. "Big A" Ahmadinejad of Iran isn't as evil as we've been led to believe.

Obligatory disclaimer: I not claiming he's a good guy. I'm not claiming he's peace-loving, US-loving, Jew-loving, or Israel-loving. He is part of an oppressive system of rule (allowing elections, true, but not really free) run by religious leaders who most agree are zealots and hostile to "The West."

Ok.

BUT, even if Iran's oppressive government has distaste for us, Jews, and Israel, it doesn't necessarily follow that they are intent on our destruction (or crazy enough to attempt our destruction even though it would almost surely mean their own). People talk about Iran or some other prospective nuclear power giving nuclear weapon material to terrorist groups. I don't know of any proof they're likely to arm such groups with nukes to attack *us*. And indeed, they have no reason to think that doing so wouldn't bring the swift US sword of death upon them, considering our massive nuclear stocks and our intelligence-gathering abilities, which may have been shown not to be perfect, but nonetheless didn't do much to STOP us from bombing perceived enemies and their helpers (see: Taliban, Afghanistan, Hussein, Iraq).

As far as conventional arms, one may consider from their perspective, that supplying traditional weapons to fighters in Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq one could see as not-unreasonable (COULD see) attempts to support these countries' fights for their own sovereignty. (One can argue -- correctly -- about the methods they choose, but one must admit all three of those countries -- well, Palestine isn't even a country yet -- are struggling over sovereignty.)

Anyway, point is, this article discusses the so-called Holocaust Denial Conference in Iran, and why it isn't what you think it is. I'll stop digging a hole for myself and refer you to there -- where the author points out he has yet to see any direct quote where Big A directly threatens preemptory action against the US or Israel, or *calls for* their destruction. The author claims Big A has *predicted* their destruction, à la someone making a paralell with the collapse, not annhilation, of the USSR. I'm not sure I'm convinced, but I have no more proof Big A is belligerent than that he's not, and I've got to say, last time we were talking about this, the US media largely got it wrong (achem: WMDs). Iran may not be friendly, or our friend, or not-dangerous, but they may not be an imminent threat (and PS, they're perfectly within their international rights to develop international power, and there's no direct revealed evidence that they are making nuclear weapons, which they couldn't complete for 5-10 years in any case if we did have proof of it.) So: Read, and think about it.

And then post a comment on my blog for goodness' sakes! I know everyone out there (all two of you) don't already agree with me, right? Tell me where I'm wrong...